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Abstract
This paper develops a model which is able to forecast exchange rate
turmoil. Our starting point relies on the empirical evidence that exchange
rate volatility is not constant. In fact, the modeling strategy adopted
refers to the vast literature of the GARCH class of models, where the
variance process is explicitly modeled. Further empirical evidence shows
that it is possible to distinguish between two diﬀerent regimes: ordinary
versus turbulence. Low exchange rate changes are associated with low
volatility (ordinary regime) and high exchange rate devaluations go to-
gether with high volatility. This calls for a regime switching approach. In
our model we also allow the transition probabilities to vary over time as
functions of economic and Þnancial indicators. We Þnd that real eﬀective
exchange rate, money supply relative to reserves, stock index returns and
bank stock index returns and volatility are the major indicators.
∗We would like to thank for helpful comments: Graciela Kaminsky, Adrian Pagan and
participants at the EC2 conference in Bologna 2002 and ASSA meeting in Washington DC
2003. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding support from the Wharton Singapore
Management University Research Center.
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1 Introduction
The decade of the nineties witnessed several bank and currency crises: Europe in
1992-93 (the European Exchange Rate mechanism), Mexico in 1994-95, Turkey
in 1994 and 2000-01, East and Southeast Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, and more
recently, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. The severity of the crises have moti-
vated researchers to develop early warning systems in order to forestall similar
crises. Such early warning systems typically involve some precise deÞnition of a
crisis and a mechanism for predicting it. A currency crisis is usually identiÞed
as an episode in which there is a sharp depreciation of the currency, a large
decline in foreign reserves, a dramatic increase in domestic interest rates or a
combination of these elements.
This paper develops a model which is able to forecast exchange rate turmoil.
Our starting point relies on the empirical evidence that exchange rate volatility is
not constant. In fact, the modeling strategy adopted refers to the vast literature
of the GARCH class of models, where the variance process is explicitly modeled.
Further empirical evidence shows that it is possible to distinguish between two
diﬀerent regimes: ordinary versus turbulence. Low exchange rate changes
are associated with low volatility (ordinary regime) and high exchange rate
devaluations go together with high volatility. This calls for a regime switching
approach. In our model we also allow the transition probabilities to vary over
time as functions of economic and Þnancial indicators.
The contribution of the paper is to recognize the importance of volatility
dynamics in forecasting turbulent regimes.
The analysis is applied to four Southeast Asian countries: Thailand, Singa-
pore, the Philippines and Malaysia. Model results will support our intuition for
modeling exchange rate volatility.
Empirical studies of currency crises employing multi-country data were initi-
ated by Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz 1994, 1995 and 1996. The initial work
was on developed countries that had pegged exchange rates, examining the
behavior of a number of macroeconomic variables during crisis and non-crisis
periods. The main Þnding was that, these macroeconomic indicators had very
diﬀerent patterns across periods in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) countries, while this was not the case for non-ERM countries. These
Þndings led to the conclusion that there were no clear early warning signals of
speculative attacks.
Subsequent researchers focused on trying to predict currency and banking
crises in developing countries. In the existing literature, there are three methods
or approaches for predicting currency crises.
One class of models for predicting currency crises is the probit regression
approach by Frankel and Rose (1996). They used probit analysis on a panel of
annual data for 105 developing countries from 1971-92. The hypothesis tested
was that currency crashes are positively linked to certain characteristics of cap-
ital inßows, such as low shares of foreign direct investments (FDI); low shares
of concessional debt or debt from multilateral development banks; high shares
of public-sector, variable short-term, and commercial bank debt. The Þnding
2
was that currency crises were more likely when foreign interest rates are high,
domestic credit growth is high, the real exchange rate is overvalued, the current
account deÞcit and Þscal deÞcit are large (as a share of GDP), external conces-
sional debt is small, and FDI is small in relation to the total volume of external
debt. However, when the model was used to generate out-of-sample predictions
for the 1997 Asian Crisis, the forecasts were not successful (Berg and Patillo,
1999a, p.118).1
A second class of models (Tornell, 1998; IMF, World Economic Outlook,
1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Corsetti Pesenti and Roubini,1998) follows
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) who used cross-country regressions to ex-
plain the Tequila (Mexican) Crisis of 1995. Using a crisis index deÞned as the
weighted sum of the percentage decrease in foreign reserves and the percent-
age depreciation of the peso, they concluded that countries had more severe
attacks when they had low foreign reserves, their banking systems were weak
and their currencies overvalued. Berg and Patillo (1999a) extended the data
to 23 other countries and concluded that the Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996)
model proved to be largely unstable. SpeciÞcation uncertainty appeared to be
as important as parameter uncertainty.
The third class of models, attributed to Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart
(1998), is the signals approach. A crisis is deÞned as a situation in which
a weighted average on monthly percentage depreciations in the currency and
monthly percentage declines in reserves exceeds its mean by more than three
standard deviations. They used 15 monthly variables to monitor for unusual
behavior during a 24-month window prior to a crisis. Threshold levels, beyond
which signals would be generated, are speciÞed. Using variants of the signals
approach, Kaminsky (1998a and1998b), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and
Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) claimed some success in predicting
the Asian crisis.
Edison (2000) concluded that research into early warning systems has pro-
vided insights into the more important indicators of vulnerability, such as, a
marked appreciation of the real exchange rate, a high ratio of short-term debt
to reserves, a high ratio of M2 to reserves, substantial losses of foreign exchange
reserves, and sharply declining equity prices.
Mariano et al. (2002) used a Markov switching regime approach to compute
the forecast probabilities of getting into a crisis. We also use a Markov switching
approach. However, we account for the fact that the volatility of exchange rate
returns is not constant over time. This creates the need for a modeling strategy
which includes a GARCH speciÞcation.
1See also Berg and Patillo (1999b). A more recent paper by Kumar, Moorthy and Per-
raudin, 2002, applied logit models to pooled data on 32 developing countries for the period
January 1985 to October 1999. The results conÞrm those of earlier studies that factors such
as declining reserves, exports and declining real activity are the most important explanatory
variables for currency crashes.
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2 Motivating our Approach
The goal of the paper is to develop an early warning methodology to predict
episodes of high risk and high exchange rate movements.
Our approach consists in modeling the conditional mean and the conditional
variance of exchange rate devaluation. The Þrst and the second order moments
of exchange rate devaluation are driven by the same Markov process governed by
an unobservable state variable. The underlying assumption is quite simple: low
mean values of exchange rate devaluation are associated with low volatility of the
exchange rate devaluation and high devaluation is associated with high volatility.
We refer to the latter regime as turbulence and the former as describing
ordinary market conditions. In addition, the transition probabilities in the
Markov process are a functions of macroeconomic and/or Þnancial variables.
This captures the idea that large exchange rate devaluations and high risk might
be driven by exogenous variables.
This approach might lead to identify currency crises. In fact, there is em-
pirical evidence (see below) showing that, at least for the four Southeast Asian
countries analyzed in this paper, high risk and high exchange rate devaluation
correspond indeed to the 1997 currency crises.
The countries considered are Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Philippines.
The sample period runs from November 1984 to December 2001.
What distinguishes our approach from the previous literature2 is the em-
phasis on the volatility process of exchange rate devaluation (we adopt GARCH
models which are models for the volatility process). To motivate our accent
on the volatility of exchange rate returns, we compute a volatility proxy. The
volatility process is not directly observable. Many volatility proxies have been
proposed in the literature. Most of them are functions of the return process
(squared returns, absolute returns). We adopt a non-standard proxy: the range.
Drawing on the results of Feller (1951), Parkinson (1980) shows that the range
(properly rescaled) is an unbiased estimator of the volatility process. Moreover,
Brunetti and Lildholdt (2002a) demonstrate that the range is superior to volatil-
ity proxies based on returns. The range is deÞned as the diﬀerence between the
maximum value of the (log of) the price process over a given interval of time
and the minimum value of the (log of) the price process over the same interval
l = max
0≤n≤N
[ln(Pn)]− min
0≤n≤N
[ln(Pn)] (1)
Our data set is composed of monthly observations. The use of monthly
data is due to the fact that many macroeconomic data used as explanatory
variables for the time varying Markov probabilities, are available only at monthly
frequencies. However, nominal exchange rate data is also available at daily
frequencies. For each month and for each exchange rate analyzed we selected the
highest (log) price and the lowest (log) price to compute the monthly range (see
Chou, 2002). Therefore, the time interval 0 ≤ n ≤ N in our set up corresponds
2See also Mariano et al. (2002).
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to a month. Finally, the volatility (standard deviation) proxy is computed as
ˆ
σi,t =
r
π
8
l (2)
where i indicates the four diﬀerent exchange rates analyzed in the paper and
t refers to the monthly observation.
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 graph the volatility proxy for the exchange rate deval-
uations of the four countries analyzed.3
2.1 Time-Varying Volatilities Approach
Since Mandelbrot (1963a, 1963b) and Fama (1965) it has been a well know fact
that asset return volatility is not constant over time. Moreover, there is a large
empirical evidence (among others see Brunetti and Lildholdt, 2002b) showing
volatility clustering: large (small) changes in the nominal exchange rate tend to
be followed by large (small) changes of either sign. These features are conÞrmed
by our data. Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 show that volatility changes over time and
evolves in clusters.
The GARCH model is able to capture both time varying volatility and
volatility clustering. Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) shows that the GARCH class
of models is able to capture the volatility dynamics of exchange rates at daily,
weekly and monthly frequencies. Even if the GARCH eﬀect dissipates as the
length of the sampling interval increases, there is still heteroskedasticity and
volatility clustering at monthly frequencies. GARCH(1,1) models have proved
to adequately describe exchange rate volatility dynamics.4 This is the approach
we follow in this paper.
2.2 Markov Regime Switching Approach
As already stated, we model jointly the conditional mean and the conditional
variance (volatility) of exchange rate devaluations. The Markov switching regime
model adopted relies on two assumptions: i) the volatility process is character-
ized by two regimes, high volatility and low volatility; ii) the high volatility
regime is associated with large exchange rate deviations (high values of the
mean process) and the low volatility regime is associated with small exchange
rate movements (low values of the mean process). The Þrst assumption is con-
Þrmed by Figures 1 to 4. For all the four countries analyzed, the volatility
process exhibits periods of very low volatility and periods of very high volatil-
ity. Interestingly, the highest volatilities coincide with the 1997 crisis which is
the major currency crisis that took place during our sample. Therefore this
crisis represents our benchmark.
3Note that the volatility proxy for Malaysia covers the period November 1984 - October
1998. In fact, after this date the currency was pegged to the US Dollar.
4For a review of the literature on GARCH models see Bera and Higgins (1993) and Boller-
slev, Engle and Nelson (1994).
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The onset of the crisis in Thailand, the Þrst country to be hit by the crisis,
was on July 1997. The average monthly volatility (standard deviation) in the
12 months after the crisis (July 1997 - June 1998) is more than seven times
bigger than in the previous 12 months (July 1996 - June 1997). Similar results
also apply to Singapore and Malaysia. For the Philippines the volatility in the
twelve months subsequent the beginning of the crisis increased by a factor of
55.
The second assumption simply implies that the same Markov process drives
both the mean and the variance of exchange rate returns. Figure 5 displays the
scatter plot of exchange rate devaluation and the volatility proxy for Thailand.
It is evident that periods of zero or low exchange rate devaluation/appreciation
are associated with low risk and periods of severe devaluations are associated
with very high exchange rate risk. In the twelve months after the onset of the
1997 crisis the level of the exchange rate devaluation increased by a factor of 8
compared to the 12 months before.
Figures 6, 7 and 8 graph the scatter plots of exchange rate devaluation
and risk for Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, respectively. Again, high
devaluation and high risk go together (turbulence regime) as well as low devalu-
ation and low risk (ordinary regime). The exchange rate devaluation increased
by a factor of 12, 59 and 54 in Singapore, Philippines and Malaysia respectively,
when comparing the twelve months before and after the crisis.
It is interesting to note the asymmetry of exchange rate devaluation and
volatility: in periods of high risk the currency devaluates. The largest outliers
in Figures 5 to 8 refer to the 1997 crisis.
The presence of two regimes - low devaluation and low volatility versus
high devaluation and high volatility - motivates the Markov switching approach
adopted. It is also evident that within the two regimes volatility is not constant.
Hence the need for a GARCH approach.
2.3 Turbulence and Crisis
The modeling strategy adopted is able to identify turbulent periods. Do turbu-
lent periods correspond to currency crises?
A currency crisis is not necessarily a turbulence period, and vice versa.
There can be a crisis without any exchange rate devaluation (and of course
without any volatility of the exchange rate devaluation). In fact, the government
might be able to absorb exchange rate pressures using foreign reserves, interest
rates, etc. On the same base the exchange rate might experience turbulence
without being in a crisis.
Citing Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999): Most often, balance-of-payments
crises are resolved through a devaluation of the domestic currency or the ßoata-
tion of the exchange rate. But central banks can and, on occasion, do resort
to contractionary monetary policy and foreign-exchange market intervention to
Þght speculative attack. (p.475-6).
Figures 1 - 4 and Figures 5 - 6 provide overwhelming evidence that the
1997 crisis resolved in a large exchange rate devaluation and high volatility.
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Our model predicts turbulent periods. Being the 1997 crises characterized by
turbulence (high volatility and large exchange rate devaluation) we should be
able to predict it.
3 Time varying probabilities Markov switching
GARCH models
Let yt be the Þrst diﬀerence of the log nominal exchange rate. The simple
GARCH(1,1) model may be written as follows:
yt = µ+
kX
i=1
θiXi,t + ut (3)
ut = σtεt, εt ∼ nid(0, 1) (4)
σ2t |Ωt−1 = ω + αu2t−1 + βσ2t−1 (5)
where Xi are the exogenous and/or lagged variables for the mean of the
returns, θ is the corresponding parameter vector and Ωt−1 is the information set
available at time t−1. For simplicity we are assuming that the innovation term
follows a normal distribution. The model is very ßexible and many extensions
have been proposed in the literature.
As shown in the previous section, in periods of currency turbulence, exchange
rate volatility is often very high and we may distinguish between two regimes:
a ordinary regime and a turbulence regime. Dueker (1997) introduced the
Markov Switching GARCH model and we adopt his approach. Equations 3-5
can be written as
yt = µt +
kX
i=1
θiXit + ut (6)
ut = σtεt, εt ∼ nid(0, 1) (7)
σ2t (St, St−1...S0) = ω (St) + α (St−1)u
2
t−1 + β (St−1)σ
2
t−1 (St−1...S0) (8)
The constant, µt, in the conditional mean equation is allowed to switch
between two regimes - high mean (µ1) and low mean (µ0),
µt = µ1St + µ0 (1− St) (9)
St ∈ {0, 1} , ∀t (10)
Pr (St = 0|St−1 = 0) = p (11)
Pr (St = 1|St−1 = 1) = q (12)
where St is the latent Markov chain of order one. We are assuming that the
parameter vector θ in the conditional mean equation is constant (i.e. it does
not switch according to the Markov process) but this assumption can be easily
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relaxed. The innovation term, ut, follows a normal distribution. Dueker (1997)
adopted a student-t distribution for the error term. We started our empirical
analysis assuming a student-t distribution for the innovations. The estimated
degrees of freedom were very high, for this reason we decided to use the normal
distribution.
The conditional variance, σ2t , is a function of the entire history of the state
variable. This is due to the autoregressive term, σ2t−1, in the conditional variance
equation - see Dueker (1997), Cai (1994) and Hamilton and Susmel (1994). Ob-
viously, it is very demanding to account for all the past history of the state vari-
able. Following Dueker (1997), we adopt an approximation procedure that seems
not to cause any problems in the evaluation of the likelihood function. This pro-
cedure implies that the conditional variance is a function of only the most recent
values of the state variable. Dueker (1997) shows that in a GARCH(1,1) model
we need to consider only the most recent four values of the state variable. This
means that the conditional variance, σ2t , is function only of the current state (St)
and the previous state (St−1): σ2t (i, j) = σ2t (St = i, St−1 = j). By integrating
out St−1, the conditional variance can be written as
σ2t (i, j) = ω (St = i) + α
£
u2t−1 (j)
¤
+ β
£
σ2t−1 (j)
¤
(13)
Equation (13) implies that the constant in the conditional variance equa-
tion is allowed to switch. In the GARCH(1,1) speciÞcation, the unconditional
variance is given by ω1−α−β . Therefore, equation (13) allows two unconditional
variances: high unconditional variance in turbulence regimes and low un-
conditional variance in ordinary regimes. Following Dueker (1997), ω (St) is
parameterized as g (St)ω such that g (S = 0) is normalized to unity.
In this setup the transition probabilities are constant. This seems over-
restrictive. Transition probabilities may depend on economic variables. For
this reason we introduce time varying probabilities. In our setup transition
probabilities are probit functions of economic variables denoted by Zt
Pr (St = 0|St−1 = 0) = p = Φ
³
Z
0
t−1ζ
´
(14)
Pr (St = 1|St−1 = 1) = q = Φ
³
Z
0
t−1ν
´
(15)
where Φ denotes the cdf of the normal distribution. A Markov switching
regime GARCH model with time varying probabilities is also developed in Grey
(1996).
This approach allows forecasting the conditional probability of being in a
given regime (i, j) at time t+ 1 given the information available at time t.
Denote
ˆ
ξt|t the (N × 1) vector of conditional probabilities of being in state
(0, 1) conditional on the data until date t. DeÞne ηt as the (N × 1) vector of the
density of yt conditional on St. Following Hamilton (1994), the optimal forecast
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for each t, is computed by iterating the following two equations
ˆ
ξt|t =
µ
ˆ
ξt|t−1 ¯ ηt
¶
10
µ
ˆ
ξt|t−1 ¯ ηt
¶ (16)
ˆ
ξt+1|t = Pt+1·
ˆ
ξt|t (17)
where 1 is the unit vector, Pt+1 is the (N ×N)Markov transition probability
matrix and ¯ denotes the element-by-element multiplication.
Recall that Pt is time varying and depends on the previous period values of
explanatory variables. We are mainly interested in the turbulent regime. Our
approach allows us to compute the probability of moving to a turbulence regime
in period t+ 1 given all the available information at time t.
The log-likelihood function is given by
lnLt (i, j) = −1
2
ln
£
σ2t (j)
¤
+ ln
·
u2t−1 (i)
σ2t (j)
¸
− ln
h√
2π
i
(18)
where i ∈ {0, 1} relates to St ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1} relates to St−1 ∈ {0, 1}.
The function is maximized following Hamilton (1994).
4 Data Description
Currency crises most often reveal themselves in an actual devaluation of the
domestic currency or the ßoatation of the exchange rate. Nevertheless, there
are occasions in which central banks wind up adopting contractionary policies.
In these cases, crises manifest themselves in interest rate hikes, depletion of
reserves, etc. Also, currency crisis are sometimes linked to banking/Þnancial
sector distresses.5
To take into account all the facets of currency crises, we consider a number
of macroeconomic and Þnancial variables: M2/reserves, real domestic credit,
real eﬀective exchange rate, banking sector stock index returns and volatility,
general stock market index returns and volatility.6 In order to get a clearer view
of the evolution of turbulent periods we use monthly data. Recall that our
model delivers the probability of getting into turbulence in period t given the
information available up until t− 1 and for this reason lower frequencies might
not be advantageous.
Real eﬀective exchange rate (REER) and interest rate diﬀerentials (IRDIFF)
are external sector indicators. In particular, the percentage deviation of the
REER from a trend is a current account indicator while the domestic-US real
interest rate diﬀerential on deposits represents an indicator associated with the
5For a literature review on the link between banking and currency crisis see Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999).
6 See appendix for a description of how those series were created.
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capital account. REER is considered as deviation from a trend because not all
real appreciations/depreciations necessarily reßect disequilibrium phenomena.
M2/reserves (M2 ratio) together with real domestic credit/GDP (RDC) are
Þnancial sector indicators. Both variables are considered in deviation from a
trend. In fact, not all the changes in those indicators are symptomatic of a
troublesome situation.
Stock index returns (GENRET) and volatility (GENVOL) are indicators of
the real sector7 linking currency crisis to economic activity.
In order to stress the link between currency crises and banking problems we
introduce returns and volatility of a stock index based on a portfolio (weighted
by the capitalization) of banks listed on the stock market (BANKRET and
BANKVOL respectively).8 We believe these variables could be important indi-
cators for the Southeast Asian crisis we study in this paper.
Citing Kaminsky and Reinhart, Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of
potential indicators. (p.481) We have considered only some of the indicators
that they suggest and add some others, based on the empirical evidence of the
countries that we analyze.
Figure 9-24 display the evolution of the above indicators for Thailand, Sin-
gapore, Philippines and Malaysia.
In all the countries the real eﬀective exchange rate is appreciating relative to
its trend during the period before the onset of the 1997 crisis, showing evidence
of overvaluation. (Note that the real eﬀective exchange rate follows the UK quo-
tation - i.e. US Dollars per local currency). For Thailand, the Philippines and
Malaysia the REER is 9-10% above the trend in the 12 months preceding the
crisis. This is in line with previous literature on currency crises. Domestic-US
real interest rate diﬀerentials do not indicate any rising expectations of devalu-
ation as the 1997 currency crisis approaches. For all the countries analyzed, in
the 12 months before the crisis, IRDIFFs are ßat.
Turning now to the Þnancial sector variables, it is possible to note that in
Thailand and Malaysia the M2/reserves deviation from trend is positive and
signiÞcative in size during the period before the onset of the 1997 crisis. This is
in line with both a large expansion in M2 and a sharp decline in foreign currency
reserves as also pointed out in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for banking and
currency crises. In Singapore and Philippines the M2 ratio does not display any
considerable deviation from trend.
RDC is above its trend before the 1997 crisis in the Philippines and Malaysia
but it is around trend in Thailand and Singapore.
The returns on the stock market index in the 12 months before the 1997
crisis are, on average, negative for all the markets considered. Particularly
severe is the drop in the general stock market index in Thailand: the monthly
return averages to -7%. Stock market volatility is also very high. The stock
7The classiÞcation of these variables as external, Þnancial and real sector indicators is based
on Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). They do not include any volatility measures as possible
indicators.
8The volatility of the general stock market index and the volatility of the banking index
are computed using the range - equations (1) and (2).
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market represents the real sector therefore, the stock market returns volatility
may be interpreted as the uncertainty/risk related to the real sector. In the
twelve months before the crisis, stock market volatility in Thailand doubles
with respect to the average value over the whole sample. Also for Singapore,
the Philippines and Malaysia stock market volatility increases.
Currency crises are sometimes evidence of banking sector distress. For this
reason we use the banking sector index. In Thailand the average monthly return
of the banking sector is -8% in the 12 months before July 1997. Evidence of
banking sector distress is also present in Singapore and Malaysia. In Thailand
the volatility of the banking index return more than doubles in the months
before the crisis. Similar results hold for Singapore and Malaysia, but not for
the Philippines.9
5 Empirical Results
For each country we estimated several models. To distinguish among models we
use the number of explanatory variables in the time varying Markov probabili-
ties. We started from the Switching Regime GARCH with constant transition
probabilities. This is Model(1,1) because it includes only a constant for each
probability. The model including an explanatory variable in the time varying
Markov probability of the ordinary state (p) is referred to as Model(2,1)
because there is a constant plus an explanatory variable in p and only a constant
in q.
To select among the diﬀerent models we use the following criteria:
1. Analysis of the statistical properties of the estimated parameters - i.e. pa-
rameters should be well-determined. On this regard, it is important to
note that GARCH models, to work properly, require many data points.
Unfortunately, the use of monthly frequencies is problematic in this re-
spect. For this reason we consider 90% signiÞcance level.
2. The estimated coeﬃcients in the probit representation of the time varying
probabilities should have the right sign so that they can have a proper
economic interpretation;
3. Forecasting performance. Our goal is to produce early warnings for
turbulence periods. If the model delivers an increase in the probability of
getting into the turbulent regime before the onset of the turbulence, we
will consider the model as satisfactory. All the turbulent periods in the
data set will be considered. However, we will pay particular attention to
the 1997 crisis;
4. Models will be compared in terms of the value of the likelihood function.
9We computed summary statistics for all the variables analyzed. However, to conserve
space we do not report them.
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In what follows we analyze the estimation results and the forecasting per-
formance of the estimated models. For the forecasting performance we report
both the graph of the forecast probabilities and tables showing the behavior of
these probabilities over turbulent periods. Providing a formal deÞnition of tur-
bulent periods, is beyond the scope of this paper. We identify turbulent periods
with severe devaluations. The tables reporting the forecast probabilities aim to
provide evidence about the performance of the estimated models.
Our analysis of the empirical results starts from Thailand, the Þrst country
involved in the 1997 crisis.
5.1 Thailand
5.1.1 Estimation Results
Table 1 reports the selected models for Thailand. For comparison we also report
the simple Model(1,1) where the Markov probabilities are constant. The simple
Model (1,1) reveals the average exchange rate devaluation during ordinary
market conditions is not statistically diﬀerent from zero and it is associated
with a very low volatility (variance) level. In the turbulence state the average
devaluation jumps to 9% (per month) which is associated with a volatility level
which is more than 500 times bigger than the ordinary state. The GARCH
parameters, α and β, are statistically well-deÞned and in line with the values
reported in the literature on exchange rate volatility. In the third column of
Table 1 we report the estimated parameters for Model(2,1). This model is
characterized by the fact that REER is added as explanatory variable in p,
the probability of being in the ordinary state at t + 1 given the information
available at time t. As for the simple Model(1,1) the two regimes are evident:
low devaluation goes with low volatility and high devaluation goes with high
volatility. Interestingly, in the conditional variance equation, α is negative,
nevertheless the conditional variance is always positive10 - this is also true for
Model (3,1). REER is signiÞcant and has the correct sign. Well before the onset
of the crises the REER is moving as to anticipate the forthcoming exchange rate
devaluation.
Model (3,1) contains REER and M2 ratio as explanatory variables in p while
q contains only a constant. Both indicators have the correct sign and are sig-
niÞcant. For this model, the volatility in the turbulent regime shifts by a factor
of 715. Finally, the two indicators in the last model are REER and the bank-
ing index returns. BANKRET has a positive sign. In fact, when the banking
sector is performing well (positive returns), the probability of staying in the
ordinary state increases. Notice that, for the last model, we were forced to use
less observations because the data on the banking index starts in February 1987.
Nevertheless, the likelihood of the last model is much higher than the likelihood
of the other models implying that the information content of the banking sector
is remarkable.
10 See Nelson and Cao (1992).
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5.1.2 Forecasting
For Thailand, in the period analyzed, the major turbulence was due to the 1997
crisis which started in July. Table 2 contains the forecast probabilities of getting
into a turbulent period at time t + 1, given the available information up until
time t (equation 17), for the selected models - see Table 1.
The second row shows the average of that probability during ordinary pe-
riods. The simple Model(1,1) is able neither to anticipate nor to provide any
warning of the 1997 crisis. The situation changes when considering Model(2,1).
In June 1997, Model (2,1) gives a 14% probability of getting into a crisis in
the next month. In absolute terms, the value of 14% is not high. However,
in relative terms - i.e. when compared to the average probability in tranquil
periods - 14% represents a noticeable jump in the probability level. Including
the M2 ratio improves our forecast - in June 1997 the probability of getting into
a crisis in the next period is 34%. However, the best forecast comes from the
last model which tells us that the probability of getting into a crisis in the next
period is equal to 82%.
Figures 25 and 26 show the forecasting probabilities of the last two models
in Table 1. Signals of the 1997 crisis are already apparent in January 1997. We
consider this a very good result.
For Thailand the indicators that proved to be important are REER, M2
ratio and bank index returns. It is interesting to note that all the model selected
contain the REER as explanatory variable. Moreover, all models have just a
constant in q - the probability of moving from turbulence to ordinary regime -
while all the action is in p - the probability of moving from an ordinary regime
to a turbulent one.
5.2 Singapore
5.2.1 Estimation Results
Table 3 reports the Þve selected models for Singapore. The simple Model(1,1)
reveals that the exchange rate devaluation exhibits two regimes. In the ordinary
regime the currency is, on average, appreciating and the volatility is low. In the
turbulent regime the currency is depreciating and the volatility shifts by a factor
of 6. The parameter β in the GARCH speciÞcation is not signiÞcantly diﬀerent
from zero. Therefore, all the models in Table 3 follow an ARCH(1) speciÞcation.
Model(2,1) includes REER in p. All the parameters are well-deÞned. If REER
is appreciating, the probability of being in the ordinary period decreases while
the probability of being in the turbulent regime increases. This is the reason
why in Model (2,2) the REER coeﬃcient is negative in p and positive in q.
For Singapore, both the banking index returns and the banking index returns
volatility are important indicators (jointly with REER). They indeed display
the expected sign and are signiÞcant.
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5.2.2 Forecasting
The forecasting probabilities of the selected models for Singapore are reported
in Table 4. We identify three periods of turbulence. The more severe turbulent
period coincides with the 1997 crisis which started in August. The other two
turbulent periods are April 2001 and October 2001. Model(1,1) is not able to
predict the 1997 crisis. However, it performs satisfactorily for the other two
turbulent periods.
Model(2,1) tells us in June 1997 that the probability to move to turbulent
period in July is 35%. This probability is 57% in the next period. Model(2,2)
performs even better - in June 1997 the probability of getting into turbulence is
55%. Also the models which include the banking return index and the banking
return index volatility perform well in forecasting not only the 1997 crisis but
also the 2001 turbulent periods.
Figures 27 and 28 graph the forecasting probabilities of Model(2,2) with
REER in both p and q, and Model(3,1) with REER and BANKSTD in p. It
is evident how both models are able to anticipate the turbulent periods exper-
imented by the Singaporean Dollar. Model(3,1) with REER and BANKSTD,
already shows symptoms of the 1997 crisis in February 1997.
Real eﬀective exchange rate, bank index returns and volatility are the im-
portant indicators for Singapore. Model(2,2) indicates that REER is important
in modeling both the probability of being in the ordinary regime and staying in
that regime and the probability of being in a turbulent regime and staying in
that regime. This is the only model, for all the countries analyzed, where it is
important to model q - i.e. q is not constant but varies over time. Combining
REER and banking indicators in modeling p, produces very interesting results
in terms of forecasting.
5.3 The Philippines
5.3.1 Estimation Results
For the Philippines, the parameter β in the conditional variance equation is
not statistically important, therefore the models analyzed reduce to an ARCH
speciÞcation. Table 5 contains the three selected models. In Model(1,1) all
the coeﬃcients are signiÞcant at standard signiÞcance level. The only two in-
dicators that are important for this country are REER and general stock index
returns. The real eﬀective exchange rate in Model(2,2) has the expected neg-
ative sign but it is not statistically important. REER is also not signiÞcant
in Model(3,1). However, the forecasting performances of the two models in-
creases considerable when the real eﬀective exchange rate is included. Notice
that Model(3,1) has been estimated using less observations (178) than the other
two models (205). This is due to the fact that we have less data on the gen-
eral stock index. Nevertheless, the log-likelihood of Model(3,1) is the highest of
all the models considered indicating that the general stock index return is an
important indicator in modeling time varying probabilities.
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5.3.2 Forecasting
The forecasting performances of the three selected models for the Philippines
are reported in Table 6. We distinguish four turbulence periods: November
1990, the 1997 crisis which started in July, July 2000 and April 2001. The sim-
ple Model(1,1) produces early warnings for the 1990, 2000 and 2001 turbulences
but fails to predict the July 1997 crisis. On the other hand, predictions prob-
abilities for Model(2,1) and Model (3,1) for the 1997 crisis, provide signals for
the impending crisis. Once again, it is important to note that, these prediction
probabilities are not in absolute terms very high but still signiÞcant relative to
their value in tranquil periods.
Figures 29 and 30 show the forecasting probabilities for the last two mod-
els in table 5. The exchange rate devaluation of the Philippine Pesos is very
volatile and shows several periods of appreciation/depreciation. The forecasting
probabilities exhibit a similar pattern.
Despite sound economic fundamentals (see Figures 17 - 20) both REER and
GENRET are gathering signs of the forthcoming crisis.
5.4 Malaysia
5.4.1 Estimation Results
The last country analyzed is Malaysia. The data sample is shortened to account
for the pegging regime that started in November 1998. Table 7 reports the four
selected models. As usual high volatility goes with exchange rate devaluation.
Model(2,1) shows that REER has the correct sign and is signiÞcant. This is in
line with the evidence provided for the other countries. The M2 ratio11 reveals
to be an important indicator and the bank index returns standard deviation
provides also very interesting results. The log-likelihood of the Model(3,1) with
REER and BANKSTD shows the highest value despite the small number of
observations.12
5.4.2 Forecasting
We identify four periods of turbulence: January 1994, August 1997,13 May 1998.
Model(2,1)-REER, Model(3,1)-REER and M2 ratio and Model(3,1)-REER and
BANKSTD already show in June 1997 the limbo of the crisis. This is not the
case for Model(1,1). The performance in predicting the 1997 crisis is spectacular
for two models: Model(3,1)-REER and M2 ratio and Model(3,1)-REER and
BANKSTD. All the models analyzed, including Model(1,1), do a very good job
in predicting the May 1998 turbulent period. These results are conÞrmed by
Þgures 31 and 32.
11For Malaysia, the Þrst diﬀerence of the M2 ratio is used. The deviation from trend for
M2 ratio resulted to be very noisy.
12Data on the bank stock index are available only from February 1986.
13As in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) we identify the onset of the Malaysian crisis with
August 1997.
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5.5 Summary of the Empirical Results
The results for all the countries analyzed show interesting common features.
First, modeling p as time varying produces the best results. Only once -
Model(2,2) for Singapore - we select a model with both p and q as time varying.
Our intuition relies on the fact that (1− p) gives the probability of getting into
turbulence from the ordinary regime. In our methodology (1− p) represents
the Þrst channel through which changes in the explanatory variables aﬀect the
forecast probabilities.
Second, the real eﬀective exchange rate displays an enormous explanatory
and predicting power in all the countries. In addition, M2 ratio, BANKRET,
BANKSTD, GENRET contain valuable information which improves the perfor-
mance of the models.
Third, all the selected models for each country are very parsimonious. This
is a very nice feature.
Finally, we would like to stress that the selected models exhibit excellent
forecasting performances.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we propose a new methodology for early warning systems. Follow-
ing Mariano et al (2002) we use a Markov switching regime model. However,
we recognize that exchange rate devaluation is characterized by heteroskedas-
ticity. Indeed, Þnancial asset returns variances are not constant over time. Our
emphasis is on the volatility process. The approach consists of jointly modeling
the conditional mean and the conditional variance of exchange rate devaluation.
This implies not only that volatility switches between two regimes, but also that
within each regime we allow volatility to follow a GARCH process. The esti-
mated parameters conÞrm that our intuition is right. More importantly, the
approach developed in the paper is able to produce very good forecasting per-
formance, at least for the countries analyzed and for the period considered. It
is interesting to note how the stock market and the banking sector indexes play
an important role in forecasting turbulences.
We should also underline that our approach exhibits several limitations:
1. It is not applicable to countries that are pegging their exchange rate. In
fact, in this case, there will not be any variation of the exchange rate and
any volatility of the exchange rate.
2. We are able to distinguish turbulence and ordinary regimes. As already
discussed, turbulence does not always coincides with currency crises.
3. The probabilities analyzed are one-step-ahead forecasts. This short hori-
zon may not be optimal for central banks who want to take measures well
in advance in order to (at least) try to avoid the crisis. On the other hand,
it is good for last minute interventions and it might represent the main
horizon for Þnancial market participants.
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4. If you have a longer horizon this approach might not be your best bet.
5. We only consider four countries and only one major currency crisis. It
remains to validate how this methodology will work with other countries
and other currency crises.
In on going research we are developing a model which is able to account
for contagion eﬀects among countries. The use of data at higher frequencies
(weekly) may provide useful information for out-of-sample forecasts at longer
horizons.
7 Appendix
7.1 Data
We created a data set for Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand com-
posed by Þve variables: exchange rate return/devaluation, M2 ratio, real do-
mestic credit/GDP, real eﬀective exchange rate devaluation, domestic-US real
interest rate diﬀerential on deposits, stock index returns and volatility, banking
sector return and volatility.
All data, with exception of the real eﬀective exchange rate and stock index
and banking sector index, are retrieved from the International Financial Statis-
tics (IFS) database. The real eﬀective exchange rate is from JP Morgan, while
stock data are from Bloomberg.
All the variables are constructed accordingly with the literatures on currency
crises, see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
M2 ratio is given by the sum of M1 (IFS line 24) and quasi money (IFS line
25) divided by Reserves (IFS line 1l.d) converted into national currency.
Real domestic credit is domestic credit (IFS line 52) divided by CPI (IFS
line 64) to obtain domestic credit in real terms and then divided by GDP (IFS
line 99b.p.). Monthly GDP is obtain by interpolating quarterly data.
Interest rate diﬀerentials are computed as diﬀerence between domestic and
US real interest rates on deposits. Real rates are deposit rates (IFS line 60)
deßated using consumer prices (IFS line 64).
Real eﬀective exchange rate is a measure of competitiveness and rises if for
example domestic inßation exceeds that abroad and the nominal exchange rate
fails to depreciate to compensate.
General stock index returns are Þrst diﬀerence of the natural logarithm of
the stock index.
General index returns volatility is computed using equations (1) and (2).
Banking index returns are Þrst diﬀerence of the natural logarithm of the
banking index.
Banking index returns volatility is computed using equations (1) and (2).
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Thailand Model(1,1)
Model(2,1)
REER
Model(3,1)
REER
M2ratio
Model(3,1)
REER
BANKRET
µ0 −0.002
(0.036)
−0.005
(0.042)
−0.119
(0.039)
0.010
(0.042)
µ1 9.380
(2.291)
6.983
(2.424)
6.773
(2.425)
4.227
(2.90)
ω 0.023
(0.007)
0.04
(0.006)
0.034
(0.005)
0.049
(0.014)
g 597.844
(414.207)
525.816
(103.844)
715.100
(164.832)
488.721
(323.025)
α 0.093
(0.045)
−0.047
(0.027)
−0.0509
(0.021)
0.168
(0.092)
β 0.804
(0.046)
0.849
(0.027)
0.873
(0.018)
0.6182
(0.072)
p
const
2.364
(0.268)
2.378
(0.314)
2.852
(0.538)
6.839
(3.856)
p
REER
−0.117
(0.066)
−0.168
(0.084)
−0.332
(0.216)
p
M2ratio
−0.725
(0.695)
p
BANKRET
0.189
(0.121)
q
const
1.809
(0.755)
0.929
(0.499)
1.362
(0.539)
0.226
(0.870)
θ 0.237
(0.064)
0.298
(0.062)
0.272
(0.065)
0.282
(0.074)
log L -257.6 -257.1 -254.2 -223.2
nobs 205 205 205 178
Table 1: Thailand: Estimation Results
Thailand ERDEV Model(1,1) Model(2,1)
RERR
Model(3,1)
RERR
M2ratio
Model(3,1)
REER
BANKRET
ordinary
period
average
0.078 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Jun-1997 -0.35 0.01 0.14 0.37 0.82
Jul-1997 16.22 0.96 0.82 0.91 0.53
Aug-1997 6.88 0.92 0.54 0.77 0.62
Sep-1997 11.12 0.94 0.77 0.88 0.40
Oct-1997 2.99 0.83 0.50 0.72 0.17
Nov-1997 4.96 0.77 0.37 0.62 0.08
Dec-1997 14.19 0.93 0.68 0.80 0.26
Jan-1998 17.24 0.95 0.75 0.85 0.27
Table 2: Thailand: Forecast
21
Singapore Model(1,1)
Model(2,1)
REER
Model(2,2)
REER
REER
Model(3,1)
REER
BANKRET
Model(3,1)
REER
BANKSTD
µ0 −0.141
(0.078)
−0.156
(0.081)
−0.192
(0.078)
−0.148
(0.077)
−0.135
(0.772)
µ1 0.348
(0.377)
0.375
(0.370)
0.450
(0.301)
0.229
(0.291)
0.208
(0.315)
ω 0.725
(0.123)
0.698
(0.120)
0.677
(0.110)
0.591
(0.105)
0.626
(0.113)
g 6.37
(2.375)
5.723
(2.102)
4.710
(1.388)
5.741
(1.679)
5.906
(1.866)
α 0.153
(0.147)
0.191
(0.146)
0.239
(0.126)
0.222
(0.129)
0.190
(0.133)
p
const
2.067
(0.336)
2.615
(0.775)
2.950
(0.895)
4.683
(3.789)
3.656
(1.794)
p
REER
−0.523
(0.365)
−0.590
(0.406)
−0.932
(−0.943)
−0.662
(0.508)
p
BANKRET
0.369
(0.295)
p
BANKSTD
−0.182
(0.110)
q
const
1.294
(0.453)
1.275
(0.431)
2.182
(1.507)
1.004
(0.335)
1.108
(0.379)
q
REER
0.481
(0.487)
θ 0.267
(0.074)
0.256
(0.074)
0.240
(0.073)
0.282
(0.073)
0.276
(0.073)
log L -319.6 -316.2 -316.0 -314.6 -316.1
nobs 205 205 205 205 205
Table 3: Singapore: Estimation Results
22
Singapore ERDEV Model(1,1)
Model(2,1)
REER
Model(2,2)
REER
REER
Model(3,1)
REER
BANKRET
Model(3,1)
REER
BANKSTD
ordinary
period
average
0.15 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.13
Jun-1997 -0.70 0.03 0.35 0.55 0.37 0.30
Jul-1997 1.39 0.08 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.50
Aug-1997 3.39 0.55 0.85 0.85 0.79 0.82
Sep-1997 1.32 0.42 0.73 0.73 0.62 0.66
Oct-1997 2.60 0.80 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.84
Nov-1997 1.27 0.66 0.75 0.75 0.67 0.68
Dec-1997 4.34 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.87
Jan-1998 5.88 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.85
Mar-2001 1.71 0.11 0.24 0.23 0.98 0.42
Apr-2001 2.23 0.17 0.33 0.35 0.83 0.49
Sep-2001 -0.57 0.61 0.68 0.88 0.87 0.73
Oct-2001 3.37 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.84 0.87
Table 4: Singapore: Forecast
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The Philippines Model(1,1)
Model(2,1)
REER
Model(3,1)
REER
GENRET
µ0 0.089
(0.038)
0.088
(0.038)
0.077
(0.041)
µ1 0.634
(0.304)
0.637
(0.300)
0.508
(0.254)
ω 0.119
(0.026)
0.119
(0.026)
0.098
(0.026)
g 46.545
(12.717)
45.962
(12.529)
41.347
(12.713)
α 0.429
(0.168)
0.421
(0.167)
0.517
(0.176)
p
const
1.453
(0.205)
1.511
(0.238)
1.558
(0.328)
p
REER
−0.020
(0.034)
−0.027
(0.051)
p
GENRET
0.002
(0.038)
q
const
1.240
(0.253)
1.271
(0.253)
1.675
(0.389)
θ 0.404
(0.058)
0.402
(0.0597)
0.458
(0.068)
log L -321.7 -321.6 -282.9
nobs 205 205 179
Table 5: The Philippines: Estimation Results
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The Philippines ERDEV Model(1,1)
Model(2,1)
REER
Model(3,1)
REER
GENRET
ordinary
period
average
0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08
Oct-1990 1.57 0.61 0.61 0.76
Nov-1990 8.38 0.89 0.90 0.95
Jun-1997 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.12
Jul-1997 4.77 0.89 0.90 0.95
Aug-1997 5.83 0.82 0.83 0.92
Sep-1997 9.92 0.86 0.87 0.93
Oct-1997 6.19 0.78 0.79 0.89
Nov-1997 0.17 0.74 0.74 0.92
Dec-1997 7.40 0.89 0.90 0.95
Jan-1998 13.78 0.83 0.84 0.92
Jun-2000 1.99 0.66 0.66 0.85
Jul-2000 3.89 0.88 0.89 0.95
Aug-2000 1.26 0.76 0.77 0.89
Sep-2000 1.85 0.87 0.88 0.92
Oct-2000 5.05 0.89 0.90 0.95
Mar-2001 0.37 0.80 0.81 0.91
Apr-2001 3.49 0.82 0.83 0.90
May-2001 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.84
Jun-2001 1.86 0.81 0.82 0.87
Jul-2001 3.30 0.86 0.87 0.92
Table 6: The Philippines: Forecast
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Malaysia Model(1,1)
Model(2,1)
REER
Model(3,1)
REER
M2ratio
Model(3,1)
REER
BANKSTD
µ0 −0.020
(0.074)
0.015
(0.072)
−0.040
(0.076)
−0.025
(0.076)
µ1 1.101
(0.992)
1.370
(1.071)
1.232
(0.962)
2.133
(1.542)
ω 0.424
(0.160)
0.531
(0.147)
0.528
(0.147)
0.445
(0.116)
g 37.66
(15.48)
37.716
(16.390)
34.084
(14.618)
65.055
(23.434)
α 0.238
(0.137)
0.201
(0.140)
0.195
(0.122)
0.000
(0.000)
β 0.155
(0.142)
0.157
(0.175)
0.129
(0.166)
0.376
(0.129)
p
const
1.885
(0.326)
2.498
(0.519)
3.442
(1.086)
4.166
(1.571)
p
REER
−0.101
(0.057)
−0.124
(0.095)
−0.189
(0.099)
p
M2ratio
−21.184
(10.326)
p
BANKSTD
−0.117
(0.077)
q
const
0.925
(0.448)
1.209
(0.388)
1.101
(0.345)
1.462
(1.180)
θ 0.261
(0.088)
0.259
(0.087)
0.271
(0.085)
0.269
(0.269)
log L -272.4 -271.0 -270.6 -239.5
nobs 167 167 167 152
Table 7: Malaysia: Estimation Results
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Malaysia ERDEV Model(1,1)
Model(2,1)
REER
Model(3,1)
REER
M2ratio
Model(3,1)
REER
BANKSTD
ordinary
period
average
0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.005
Dec-1993 0.78 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.33
Jan-1994 5.30 0.82 0.88 0.86 0.93
Jun-1997 0.40 0.04 0.20 0.18 0.25
Jul-1997 1.96 0.15 0.45 0.94 0.49
Aug-1997 6.41 0.82 0.88 0.86 0.92
Sep-1997 9.40 0.78 0.86 0.84 0.91
Oct-1997 8.89 0.70 0.81 0.78 0.89
Nov-1997 2.99 0.53 0.66 0.61 0.74
Dec-1997 10.62 0.82 0.89 0.86 0.91
Jan-1998 15.68 0.77 0.86 0.84 0.92
Apr-1998 -0.53 0.37 0.50 0.45 0.63
May-1998 2.38 0.34 0.44 0.46 0.49
Jun-1998 4.35 0.57 0.69 0.71 0.67
Table 8: Malaysia: Forecast
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Fig.1: Thailand - Volatility
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Fig.2: Singapore - Volatility
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Fig.3: Philippines - Volatility
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Fig.4: Malaysia - Volatility
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Fig.5: Thailand
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Fig.6: Singapore
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Fig.7: Philippines
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Fig.8: Malaysia
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Fig.9: Thailand - External Sector
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Fig.10: Thailand - Financial Sector
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Fig.11: Thailand - Real Sector
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Fig.12: Thailand - Banking Sector
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Fig.13: Singapore - External Sector
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Fig.14: Singapore - Financial Sector
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Fig.15: Singapore - Real Sector
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Fig.16: Singapore - Banking Sector
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Fig.17: Philippines - External Sector
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
19
84
:1
1
19
85
:0
9
19
86
:0
7
19
87
:0
5
19
88
:0
3
19
89
:0
1
19
89
:1
1
19
90
:0
9
19
91
:0
7
19
92
:0
5
19
93
:0
3
19
94
:0
1
19
94
:1
1
19
95
:0
9
19
96
:0
7
19
97
:0
5
19
98
:0
3
19
99
:0
1
19
99
:1
1
20
00
:0
9
20
01
:0
7
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
REER IRDIFF ERDEV
Fig.18: Philippines - Financial Sector
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
19
84
:1
1
19
85
:0
9
19
86
:0
7
19
87
:0
5
19
88
:0
3
19
89
:0
1
19
89
:1
1
19
90
:0
9
19
91
:0
7
19
92
:0
5
19
93
:0
3
19
94
:0
1
19
94
:1
1
19
95
:0
9
19
96
:0
7
19
97
:0
5
19
98
:0
3
19
99
:0
1
19
99
:1
1
20
00
:0
9
20
01
:0
7
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
RDC M2ratio
36
Fig.19: Philippines - Real Sector
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Fig.20: Philippines - Banking Sector
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Fig.21: Malaysia - External Sector
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Fig.22: Malaysia - Financial Sector
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Fig.23: Malaysia - Real Sector
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Fig.24: Malaysia - Banking Sector
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Fig.25: Thailand - Model31 (REER,M2ratio)
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Fig.26: Thailand - Model31 (REER, BANKRET)
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Fig.27 : Singapore - Model22 (REER)
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Fig.28: Singapore - Model31 (REER, BANKSTD)
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Fig.29: Philippines - Model21 (REER)
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
19
84
:1
2
19
85
:0
7
19
86
:0
2
19
86
:0
9
19
87
:0
4
19
87
:1
1
19
88
:0
6
19
89
:0
1
19
89
:0
8
19
90
:0
3
19
90
:1
0
19
91
:0
5
19
91
:1
2
19
92
:0
7
19
93
:0
2
19
93
:0
9
19
94
:0
4
19
94
:1
1
19
95
:0
6
19
96
:0
1
19
96
:0
8
19
97
:0
3
19
97
:1
0
19
98
:0
5
19
98
:1
2
19
99
:0
7
20
00
:0
2
20
00
:0
9
20
01
:0
4
20
01
:1
1
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
ER Prob1
Fig.30: Philippines - Model31 (REER, GENRET)
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Fig.32: Malaysia - Model32 (REER,BANKSTD)
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Fig.31: Malaysia - Model31 (REER,M2ratio)
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